T his book has been much praised and deservedly so. It is wellwritten and well-researched. and mirabile dictu, it includes substantial material on the impact of the half-million Canadians who, along with some three million Americans, served time in Britain during the Second World War.
Reynolds, a Cambridge University historian married to an American, has done extensive research in the British, American, and Canadian archives. and he has read widely in the secondary literature. The result is a detailed examination of the way different cultures dealt with each other. clashed or integrated, and how the respective bureaucracies tried to cope. There is even some material on how Canadians and Americans got on-badly at first but better as time went on, thanks, Reynolds opines, to the fact that Canadians carne to see that their British past was being replaced by an American future. He even cites Major-General F.F. Worthington as suggesting that since American equipment and ideas were better than those of the British. Canadians should try to serve with the U.S. forces. No wonder Fighting Frank had to be got rid of in 1 944! The Americans, of course, had special problems -black soldiers. for example -that the Canadians had and, according to black Gls, the Canadian Army handled matters much better. The Americans also wanted their full pay, better food than hungry Brttish civilians. and the right to try their soldiers in their own courts; they had sufficient clout to get their way (including food that amounted to three times the civilian ration This book remains, however, an account of the Canadian contribution to the victory at sea. As with his earlier work. North Atlantic Run, Milner is not uncritical of the manner in which it was conducted. With the success of the convoy system finally assured, "hunter-killer" groups were formed to specifically destroy submarines.
Zones of responsibility were established, which saw the United States Navy with its carrier-based groups. taking a larger share of the responsibility. In some cases, this marginalized the Canadian effort.
There were many different reasons for this occurrence, not the least of which was the unavailability of modem equipment for Canadian use. Certainly the aspirations of Admiral Percy Nelles and the professional navy for its postwar fleet. were partly to blame. Other reasons have a basis in decisions not to pursue the construction of more advanced types of escorts, such as the superb Castle-class corvette. The abortive Canadian designed RX/C radar was yet another set back. A sensitive unit, it worked very well, when it worked. but its maintenance requirements were such that it was impractical for active duty.
With the arrival of long range patrol (LRPJ aircraft such as the B-24 Liberator. and the availability of better 10 em radar sets, the nature of the Atlantic war was drastically changing by late 1944. Ships equipped with type 144 I 45 sonar, and the "Q" attachment, as well as the more advanced type 14 7B sonar, made identifying a submarine in open water easier.
This resulted in the Escort Groups achieving a much higher success rate against U-Boats. However, the problem of identifying a submerged submarine in shallow inshore waters. persisted throughout the war. Situations such as the "layering" of water due to differing temperatures played havoc with accurate identification. Therefore spring and fall became the best times for sub-hunting. The technology of bathythermography was developed in an attempt to combat this situation, and was marginally successful. Other methods were developed to tackle the threat of the U-Boat such as hunts to exhaustion. These so called "salmon operations" were organized in an effort to kill elusive U-Boats, but usually resulted in the vast expenditure of explosives with little to show.
Canadian support groups had. by wars end, become quite adept at sinking U-Boats; and what makes this achievement remarkable was the fact that it was accomplished almost solely by the volunteer navy. As Milner suggests, the professional navy was concerned with postwar careers, and the accumulation of fleet destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft carriers. But he never lets the reader forget that the Canadian Navy's primary responsibility was the safe escort of convoys; something which was accomplished with great success, under the most dire of circumstances.
In the end, The U-Boat Hunters is presented as a well-researched account of the late war activities of the RCN. A "good read," it is supported by maps. photographs, comprehensive notes. and a listing ofU-Boat kills by the RCN from May 1943 to May 1945. This volume is a welcome addition to Milner's first book North Atlantic Run, and should be enjoyed by the Naval fraternity and the general public alike.
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